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Recently,  several  problems  with  elicited utility  functions  have emerged.  This paper  con-
cerns a fundamental  problem  in risk preference  classification with elicited data. For  the sample
in  this  research,  different  functional  forms  resulted  in  reversals  in  preference  classifications.
This paper  suggests  that preference  classifications  must be  interpreted  with caution.
Agricultural  economists have estimated
utility  functions  for  both  normative  and
positive research on risky behavior.  Initial
experience  with  estimating  utility  func-
tions  created  optimism  concerning  the
usefulness of this technique in research and
extension-Anderson  et al. is an example
of  this  viewpoint.  More  recently  several
studies  have  dampened  this  optimism.
Binswager  concluded  that  direct  elicita-
tion procedures  do not yield  reliable data
over time and among different interview-
ers.  Whittaker  and Winter supported this
conclusion.  They  obtained  significant
regression  coefficients  of  opposite  sign
from  regressing  risk  aversion  coefficients
from utility functions elicited at two times
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on  socioeconomic  variables.  In  recent re-
view  articles  of  risk analysis,  Young  and
Roumasset  concluded  that  approaches
other  than direct  elicitation appear  to be
more fruitful research approaches.
This  paper  considers  choice  of  func-
tional  form,  which is  another  problem  in
estimation  of  utility  functions.  Lin  and
Chang  have  previously  noted  that  selec-
tion  of  appropriate  functional  form  can
improve specifications  of optimal farm or-
ganization plans. The research reported in
this  paper  concerns  even  a more  funda-
mental  problem-different  functional
forms can lead to different individual risk
preference  classifications.  For the majori-
ty of  the individuals  in  this study,  a dif-
ferent  functional  form  led  to  switches
among  the  categories  of  risk  preference,
risk  indifference,  and  risk  aversion.  This
particular  problem  arose  in  the  initial
phases  of  a  multidisciplinary  study  to
evaluate  elicitation  methodologies.  The
research  procedures  are  designed  to  ac-
commodate  problems  found  in  previous
studies and are  discussed  in the  next sec-
tion.
Design  of Elicitation  Procedure
Risk  preferences  are usually  elicited  in
the context of generalized  games  (Ander-
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son  et al.).  Recently,  Young  and  Musser
and  Musser  have  utilized  psychological
literature  to  criticize  this standard proce-
dure.  A major  problem  with  the general-
ized  games  arises  from  the  existence  of
goals  in  addition  to  income  or  wealth
which are not encompassed  in the expect-
ed  utility  model  (Patrick  and  Klieben-
stein).  Since these other goals are likely  to
vary among situations, risk preferences es-
timated  from  generalized  situations  will
not  likely predict  behavior in  specific  sit-
uations.  The  proposition  is  derived  from
conclusions  in  psychological  research  on
attitudes-only  specific  attitudes  reliably
predict behavior  (Fishbein and  Ajzen).
Psychological concepts  also suggest that
use of generalized  games could contribute
to  unstable  measures  of  risk  preferences.
Tversky  and  Kahneman  have  noted  that
people  are not  very good  intuitive statis-
ticians  and tend  to use  heuristics  in their
probability  judgments.  One  of these  heu-
ristics, availability, refers to the tendency
of  individuals  to  use  the  most  accessible
rather than comprehensive information  in
their probability judgments.  It is plausible
that individuals  would  use an  experience
from  a recent  specific  situation for  a ref-
erence  point  in judgments  in  a  general-
ized  elicitation  procedure.  If  a  different
situation  is  used  for  reference  at  a  later
date, the risk preferences  would probably
vary because  other goal achievement may
differ  in  the  two  situations.  If  the  risk
preferences  are elicited  within a particu-
lar context familiar to the individuals, this
potential  source  of  unstable  preferences
may be eliminated. Some evidence in sup-
port  of  this  view  is  provided  by  Officer
and  Halter. Their research  used a specific
setting,  fodder  reserves,  and found stable
preferences  over time.
The  data  used  in  this study  were  elic-
ited  from  13 graduate  students  in  an  ag-
ricultural  finance  class  at  the  University
of  Georgia  in winter  quarter,  1981.  The
paradigm  used  for  elicitation  involved
graduate  research assistantships.  The util-
ity  function  was  elicited  for  income  for
one academic  quarter ranging  from  $0 to
$3,500.  Preliminary  questionnaires  re-
vealed this  range of  budgetary  levels  for
graduate  students.  Certainty  equivalents
were elicited for 15 pairs of risky incomes.
Thus,  the  elicitation  game  concerned  a
specific  standard  decision  context  for  a
range  of  income  within  current  experi-
ence.  The  modified  Von  Neumann-Mor-
genstern  procedure  was  utilized  in  the
elicitation. This approach  was easier to ex-
plain  to  non-economists  in  the  multidis-
ciplinary context  of this research than the
more  popular  Ramsey  approach.  Officer
and Halter  provide some support for this
decision by obtaining  similar  results with
both  procedures.
Besides  the  use  of  a  specific  decision
context, the elicitation procedure  involves
two major operational differences  from the
standard  procedure  (Anderson  et al., pp.
71-75)  as  suggested  by  psychological
methodology.  First,  the  individuals  were
directly  asked their  certainty  equivalents
for  risky  prospects  rather  than  asked  to
choose among alternative certainty equiv-
alents  suggested  by  the  interviewer.  The
approach  was utilized to avoid the poten-
tial  anchoring  bias  in  the  standard  ap-
proach  (Roumasset,  p.  10-11). The  use  of
a  specific  decision  context  made  this  di-
rect approach more feasible. The other dif-
ference is that a check question  procedure
to  ensure  consistent  responses  among  the
different  decisions  was  omitted.  Such
practices  can  force the  data to  be  consis-
tent with a limited set of initial responses,
which may be biased, rather than the sub-
sequent responses.  Furthermore,  the check
question  may allow the preconceptions  of
the interviewer  to bias the responses.
Functional Forms
Lin  and  Chang  suggested  use  of  Box-
Cox  transformations  of  linear  and  qua-
dratic  functions as  a general  approach  to
the problem of specification  of functional
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form  for  utility  functions.  Subsequently,
Buccola  (1982b)  demonstrated  that  Box-
Cox transformations  and  other functional
forms, such as the power function,  are in-
appropriate utility functions since they do
not  include  an  intercept.  Based  on  this
reasoning,  a quadratic,  semilog, and mod-
ified power functional forms were utilized
in  this  research.  The  reasoning  for  these
particular  choices  is delineated  in the fol-
lowing discussion.'
As Young  noted,  several  different mea-
sures  have  been  used  to  classify  the  risk
preferences  of  individuals.  The  sign  of
the  second  derivative  of  the  function,
U"(M),  is a common measure for this pur-
pose  where  U"(M)  >  0,  U"(M)  =  0,  and
U"(M)  < 0  imply  risk  preference,  indif-
ference  and  aversion,  respectively.  The
absolute  risk  coefficient,  r(M)= -U"(M)/
U'(M),  can also  be  used for classifications
where  r(M)  > 0,  r(M)  = 0,  and  r(M)  < 0
imply risk aversion, indifference and pref-
erence, respectively.  The latter measure  is
particularly  useful  for  positive  analysis
with  individual  risk  preferences  because
it is unique and therefore allows interper-
sonal comparisons  (Pratt). These measures
can be readily derived for the three func-
tional  forms used in  this research.
The quadratic  expresses utility  (U)  as a
function  of money  (M) as follows:
U = a + bM  + cM2  (1)
where a, b, and c are parameters.  For risk
classification,  U"(M)  =  2c  and  r(M)  =
-2c/(b +  2cM). The  sign  of  c, subject to
the requirement that b +  2cM  > 0, allows
classification.  The  quadratic  utility  func-
tion  was  popular  in  early  applications  of
expected  utility  theory.  Beginning  with
Pratt, however,  the quadratic began to fall
into  theoretical  disfavor  because  it  re-
Hildreth  has suggested several  other more complex
functional forms,  which  are theoretically  appropri-
ate.  One  of  the  more  popular  is  the  exponential
form.  Buccola  (1982a)  has  recently  contrasted  the
exponential  and quadratic  forms.
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quires the intuitively implausible assump-
tion  of  increasing  absolute  risk  aversion.
As  Anderson  et al.  (pp.  94-95)  and  Buc-
cola  (1982a)  argue, this function  may still
approximate  preferences  relevant  for
many  short-run  decisions  in  agricultural
economics.  Since this research was a com-
ponent of  a  longer study  which  required
classification and comparisons of risk pref-
erences and their relationship  to short-run
behavior,  this function was included in the
analysis.  Another  advantage  of  the  qua-
dratic  is  its  ease  of  estimation,  which  is
particularly  important for a large sample.
The  semilog  function  is  another  alter-
native also  having linear  parameters:
U = a + b  log M (2)
where a and  b are parameters,  and log  is
the  natural  logarithm  operator.  For  this
function,  U"(M)  = -b/M 2 and  r(M)  =
1/M. This function has the desirable prop-
erty of  imposing decreasing  absolute  risk
aversion.  All  risk  averse  individuals  will
have the same value  of r(M)  for any value
of  M,  thus  severely limiting this  function
for  many  positive  analyses.  In  addition,
the function imposes risk  aversion on  util-
ity data  since  U'(M)  >  0  requires  b > 0.
Therefore,  the  function  is  not  useful  for
many  applications  concerning  risk  pref-
erence  classification.  The  function  does
provide  an  interesting  contrast  with  the
other,  more  flexible  function  forms  con-
sidered in  this paper.
The  third  functional  form  used  in  this
paper is  a modified  power function:
U = a + bM (3)
where  a, b, and c are parameters.  For this
function,  U"(M)=  (c  - )(c)bMc - 2 and
r(M) =  (1 - c)/M.  This  function  must
have b > 0 and c  > 0. The  value of  c can
be used to classify risk preferences:  an in-
dividual  is risk  averse,  risk neutral  or risk
seeking  if  c  < 1, c  = 1, or  c  > 1, respec-
tively.  The  function  does  embody  de-
creasing  absolute  risk  aversion  for  risk
averse  individuals.  Its main disadvantage
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TABLE  1.  Quadratic Regression  Results: U = a + bM  + cM 2.
Absolute  Risk
Subjects  a  b  c  Coefficienta
A  1,077.33  7.642  -0.00186  0.00325
(0.528)  (1.286)  (-0.488)
B  1,039.46  3.448  -0.00026  0.00020
(1.543)*  (2.638)***  (0.569)
C  -13,002.7  16.7682  -0.00319  0.00113
(-3.078)***  (3.564)***  (-2.703)***
D  -11,697.3  13.150  -0.00209  0.00071
(-1.029)  (1.168)  (-0.810)
E  -2,452.34  7.164  -0.00113  0.00070
(-1.893)*  (4.237)***  (-2.494)***
F  -9,442.38  9.934  -0.00127  0.00046
(-2.043)**  (2.165)**  (1.187)
G  -42,327.3  35.634  -0.00626  0.00091
(3.298)***  (3.446)***  (-3.244)***
H  -2,948.68  6.193  -0.00059  0.00028
(-1.126)  (1.820)**  (-0.557)
-7,441.51  6.024  -0.0034  0.00014
(-1.351)  (1.266)  (-0.350)
J  -70,726.7  46.604  -0.00687  0.00061
(-1.473)  (1.417)*  (-1.249)
K  -770.32  4.519  -0.00044  0.00029
(-0.693)  (3.037)***  (-1.048)
L  -510.06  2.623  0.00024  -0.00014
(-0.264)  (1.060)  (0.329)
a Absolute  risk coefficients are estimated  at the mean,  M = 1,750.
*Indicates  a significance level of 0.10.
**  Indicates a significance level of 0.05.
*** Indicates a significance level of 0.025.
is  that nonlinear  least squares  procedures
must  be  used  for  estimation  which  may
be  undesirable  for  a large  sample  of in-
dividuals.
After  regression  results  are  obtained,
two approaches  can be utilized  to classify
risk preferences  for individuals.  The  sim-
plest  method  uses  the  regression  coeffi-
cients  as  point estimates  of the  appropri-
ate  parameters  for classification  with the
different functional forms discussed above.
The  other  approach  employs  student's
t-tests  to  test  hypotheses  concerning  the
relation of the regression  coefficients to the
theoretical  values  of  these  parameters.
Following  King,  the  standard  hypothesis
that the regression  coefficients  equal  zero
may  not be  of the most  theoretical  inter-
est. The  above discussion implies  that c =
0  and  b = 0 are  appropriate  tests for  the
quadratic and semilog respectively.  How-
ever,  c =  1 is  the appropriate  test for  the
modified  power  function.  These  hypoth-
eses tests are employed in the next section.
Results
The  regression  results  for  the  three
functional forms for the individuals in the
sample are presented in Tables  1-3. Stan-
dard t-statistics for the hypothesis that the
coefficient  equals zero are included in pa-
rentheses.  Absolute  risk  aversion  coeffi-
cients  estimated  at  the  mean  level  of
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TABLE  2. Semilog  Regression  Results:  U=




jects  a  b  cienta
A  -8,390.8  2,152.24  0.00057
(-1.690)*  (2.742)***
B  -5,111.49  1,554.36  0.00057
(-2.671)***  (5.498)***
C  -54,345.2  8,056.27  0.00057
(-6.155)***  (6.740)***
D  -59,554.7  8,607.85  0.00057
(-3.960)***  (4.302)***
E  -27,959.0  4,605.28  0.00057
(-7.223)***  (8.573)***
F  -63,447.8  9,048.27  0.00057
(-6.877)***  (7.436)***
G  -43,531.8  6,130.28  0.00057
(-2.365)***  (2.644)***
H  -35,564.6  5,992.52  0.00057
(-4.358)***  (5.349)***
I  -73,136.7  10,075.6  0.00057
(-7.701)***  (8.244)***
J  -127,178.0  16,640.2  0.00057
(-4.959)***  (5.159)***
K  -19,933.7  3,488.21  0.00057
(-5.266)***  (6.653)***
L  -23,549.8  3,895.21  0.00057
(-3.656)***  (4.446)***
a Absolute risk coefficients are estimated at the mean,
M  = 1,750.
* Indicates a significance level of 0.10.
**  Indicates a significance level of 0.05.
*** Indicates a significance level of 0.025.
$1,750 in the elicitation procedure  are also
presented.  For  the  quadratic  form,  only
C,  E,  and  G  have  coefficients  on  the  in-
come squared that differ significantly from
zero  at  the  95  percent  confidence  level
(Table  1).  These  three  coefficients  are
negative  implying  that  these  individuals
are risk averse. All other individuals would
be  classified as  risk neutral.  However,  the
quadratic  did  not  fit  well  for  subjects  A,
D, I and L, as none of the coefficients were
significant at 90 percent  level. In contrast,
the  semilog  results  in  Table  2  are  more
satisfactory statistically with all the b coef-
ficients significant at the 97.5 percent con-
fidence  level,  so  that  all  individuals  are
classified as risk averse.  Only individual L
had  a  significant  coefficient  for the  mod-
ified power function  results in Table  3.
The  risk  classifications  for  the  subjects
from these regressions based on U"(M) are
summarized  in  Table  4.  As  indicated
above,  the semilog relationships  impose  a
risk averse classification  on all subjects.  The
nonlinear  relationship  exhibits  the  same
risk classification  for  all  subjects,  risk  in-
difference.  Using  the  value  of  (c  - 1)  to
classify  subjects, none of the c  parameters
are significantly  different from one  based
on t-tests at a 90 percent  confidence level.
Thus,  the  quadratic  function  is  the  only
relationship which does not classify all the
subjects into the same risk preference  clas-
sification.  Subjects  C,  E,  and  G  are  clas-
sified as risk averse while all the other sub-
jects  are risk  indifferent.  The differences
in classification are dramatic:  not one sub-
ject  is  classified  the  same  with  all  three
functions.
Risk  preferences  can  also  be  classified
with the absolute risk  aversion coefficient.
Since  the  classifications  are  the  same  as
with  the second  derivative,  these  are not
explicitly discussed  in this paper. The ab-
solute  risk  aversion  coefficient  does  allow
comparison  of  the  level  of  risk  aversion
among individuals  except for the semilog
function.  The  coefficients  vary  from
-0.00014  for  subject  L,  the  least  risk
averse, to  0.00325 for subject  A, the most
risk averse  subject for the quadratic  func-
tion  (Table  1).  For  the  modified  power
function, the same individuals  exhibit the
extreme values ranging from  -0.00014 for
subject  L  to 0.00026  for subject  A  (Table
3).  A Spearman  rank coefficient  test indi-
cated  that  the  risk  aversion  coefficients
were associated at a 90 percent confidence
level. These results suggest that the use  of
different  functional  forms  may  not  alter
the rankings of risk aversion  of individuals
for  positive  analysis.  However,  this  con-
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TABLE 3.  Nonlinear Regression  Results: U = a + bMc.
Absolute Risk
Subjects  a  b  c  Coefficienta
A  -222.902  152.746  0.553  0.00026
(-0.035)  (0.161)  (0.715)
B  649.033  21.173  0.748  0.00014
(0.536)  (0.382)  (2.345)
C  50.000  1.000  1.100  0.000006
(0.004)  (0.030)  (0.281)
D  50.0000  1.000  1.100  -0.00006
(0.002)  (0.018)  (0.169)
E  -748.299  11.177  0.843  0.00009
(-0.188)  (0.180)  (1.301)
F  27.711  1.036  1.096  -0.00006
(0.002)  (0.040)  (0.374)
G  -570.253  1.939  0.993  0.000004
(-0.015)  (0.014)  (0.121)
H  -807.105  2.006  1.076  -0.00004
(-0.171)  (0.119)  (1.051)
I  ~  -785.702  1.842  1.031  -0.00002
(-0.050)  (0.038)  (0.343)
J  -715.579  2.168  0.994  0.000004
(-0.005)  (0.005)  (0.041)
K  -226.071  3.193  0.960  0.00002
(-0.073)  (0.130)  (1.046)
L  -169.800  0.461  1.244  -0.00014
(-0.069)  (0.164)  (1.666)*
a Absolute  risk coefficients are estimated at the mean,  M = 1,750.
* Indicates a significance level of 0.10.
**  Indicates a significance level of 0.05.
*** Indicates a significance level of 0.025.
elusion  is only tentative  because  many of
the coefficients  are calculated  from  insig-
nificant  regression  coefficients.
Conclusion
This paper  presents  initial analysis of  a
potentially  fundamental  problem  in  the
use of elicited utility data.  Different func-
tional  forms  can  result  in  different  risk
preference  classifications  based  on  the
same  data.  Two  of  the  functions  in  this
analysis  classified  most of the  individuals
as risk neutral while  the semilog imposed
risk  aversion  on  all  the  individuals.  The
quadratic  and the  modified  power  func-
tion  also  indicated  different  preference




Quadratic  U"(M)=  (c - 1)
Subject  U"(M)  2c  -b/M2 cbM-  2
A  I  A
B  I  A
C  A  A
D  I  A
E  A  A
F  I  A
G  A  A
H  I  A
I  I  A
J  I  A
K  I  A
L  I  A
a I stands for risk indifference, A stands for risk averse.
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classifications for several individuals. These
results  indicate  that caution  must  be  ob-
served  in  analyzing  utility  functions  de-
rived  from  a  specified  functional  form.
Past  studies  of  risk  preference  classifica-
tion,  such  as  reviewed  by  Young,  there-
fore,  are  not  necessarily  definitive.  Esti-
mation  of  several  functional  forms  and
comparison  of their  results  is one method
of increasing  confidence  in the  risk pref-
erence classification.  For example, most of
the  subjects  in the  analysis  in  this paper
appear  to  be  risk  neutral  when  function
forms that do not impose risk  aversion are
utilized. The lack of statistical significance
in  the  quadratic  and  modified  power
function  suggest  utilization of more com-
plex  forms, especially for normative  anal-
ysis.  However,  the  computational  disad-
vantages  of  nonlinear  least  squares  may
limit  the  usefulness  of  some  of  these  al-
ternative functions for positive analysis in-
volving large  samples.
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